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MULTIPLE DISCRIMINATION IN A MULTICULTURAL EUROPE: ACHIEVING 
LABOUR MARKET EQUALITY THROUGH NEW GOVERNANCE 
 
Diamond Ashiagbor 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of this article, ‘Multiple discrimination in a multicultural Europe: Achieving 
labour market equality through new governance’, is one in which almost every element 
is contested and requires explanation: what is meant by multiple discrimination; is it 
right to say the European Union is ‘multicultural’; how does one define ‘new 
governance’? My focus is more specifically on the intersection between gender and race 
in the European Union labour market, and the merits of new governance approaches in 
redressing labour market inequality. My interest in the issue of multiple discrimination, 
what has also been labelled intersectional or multidimensional discrimination, begins 
with some theoretical and empirical observations about the interaction between race and 
gender in the UK labour market. Anti-discrimination law and policies aimed at tackling 
labour market discrimination have been predicated on an understanding of the labour 
market which views race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience; the 
understandings of women’s labour market participation which typically inform 
theorizing and campaigning around anti-discrimination law tend to be premised on an 
essentialist view of women. A major insight of the early black feminist movement in the 
US, in response to the experience of the civil rights movement, the Black Liberation 
movement and the women’s movement, was that all too often, ‘black’ was equated with 
black men, and ‘woman’ was equated with white women. As a result, black women 
were an invisible group whose existence and needs were ignored. This insight is 
encapsulated in the title of one of the first collections of essays on black women’s 
studies, published in 1982: All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some 
of Us Are Brave.1 One of the aims of the black feminist movement was to develop 
theory which could adequately address the way race, gender, and other facets of identity 
were interconnected.2 What is crucial here is the move away from the supposition of a 
                                                
1  G. T. Hull, P. B. Scott, and B. Smith (eds.) All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But 
Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies (New York, 1982). 
2  See http://www.mit.edu/activities/thistle/v9/9.01/6blackf.html. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701902
 2 
unitary gender identity: namely, that there is an ‘essential’ woman’s experience which 
can be described independently of factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, sexual 
orientation, etc. Further, at the empirical level, it is clear that equality campaigners and 
lawyers have succeeded in obtaining legally significant gains for women, but by 
assuming a common or universal norm, for instance, that the experience of white 
women within the labour market speaks for all women. By way of an example from the 
UK: research based on the 1991 and 2001 censuses has shown that the standard British 
pattern of women’s employment is in fact a white pattern, and cannot be generalized to 
other ethnic groups.3 For instance, the recognition that unequal treatment of part-time 
workers may amount to indirect sex discrimination is an important one, since the 
majority of part-time workers in the UK are women with family responsibilities. 
However, the prominence given to part-time work and domestic responsibilities as 
determinants of the sexual division of labour and of differential rewards between men 
and women’s paid work can be seen as ethnocentric, since part-time working is not, in 
fact, a major factor in keeping black and Asian women’s pay and prospects so far below 
those of white men. Whilst responsibility for child-care and home management does 
have a major influence on the participation of women in the UK labour market, this 
influence varies significantly between ethnic groups.4 
 
Given recent developments in EU equality law, in particular, the introduction of Article 
13 into the EC Treaty and the multiplication of the grounds on which discrimination is 
forbidden – to include race and ethnic origin,5 religion and belief, disability, sexual 
orientation and age6 as well as the pre-existing ground of gender7 – I’m interested in 
                                                
3  For a fuller analysis of the UK experience, see my ‘The Intersection Between Gender and Race in the 
Labour Market: Lessons for Anti-discrimination Law’ in A. Morris and T. O’Donnell (eds.) Feminist 
Perspectives on Employment Law (London, 1999). 
4  According to the 2001 Census for the UK, while some 41.5 per cent of white women employees 
worked part-time, only 35.5 per cent of non-white women did so. For black women (namely, Black 
Caribbean, Black African and Black Other), the figures are starker, with around 25 per cent of black 
women working part-time. Black Caribbean women have a high rate of single parenthood relative to 
other groups, but also have high rates of participation in the labour market and high rates of full-time 
employment: S. Botcherby and K. Hurrell, EOC Briefing, Ethnic minority women and men 
(Manchester, 2004); Government Equalities Office, Minority Ethnic Women in the UK Factsheet 
(London, 2007); T. Rees, Women and the Labour Market (London, 1992) at 19. 
5  Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L180/22, 19.7.2000. 
6  Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, OJ L303/16, 2.12.2000. 
7  Directive 75/117 EC on equal pay for men and women; Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC, and 
also Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, L 269/15, 5.10.2002. 
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interrogating the extent to which EU equality law has been able to conceptualize and 
respond to ‘multiple’, ‘multidimensional’ or ‘complex’ discrimination, in particular, at 
the intersection between gender and race. This requires mapping of the labour market 
situation of ethnic minority women in the European Union, in terms of economic 
activity rates, pay, job quality and discrimination, and in considering the response of EU 
law. But to conduct such a mapping exercise, it is first necessary to lay bare the 
differing understandings of race and ethnicity across the various EU Member States: the 
extent to which a state perceives itself as mono- or multicultural, and its approach to the 
management of minority populations, is hugely significant for its approach to what 
labour market equality should look like, what kind of diversity is a legitimate goal. 
Second, this article will explore responses to complex discrimination from the 
perspective of what has become known as ‘new governance’. The term ‘new 
governance’, at its simplest, is used to refer to the widely-observed shift within the EU 
from top-down, rule-based, centralized regulatory approaches towards more open, 
collaborative forms of rule-making, a shift which can be seen as a reaction to the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to regulate complex fields such as the labour market, 
and in seeking to regulate a diverse number of jurisdictions, by means of conventional 
‘command and control’ mechanisms.8 
 
Ultimately, I argue that a ‘hybrid’ approach to regulation, which combines ‘old 
governance’ mechanisms (such as the Race Directive) and alternatives to hard law, such 
as gender mainstreaming and diversity management, have the potential to provide a 
stronger framework for internalizing equality values, and one better suited to 
recognizing intersectional or multidimensional discrimination, than a focus on 
(traditional forms of) litigation and ex-post rule enforcement. 
 
MULTIPLE DISCRIMINATION AND MULTICULTURALISM 
 
Intersectionality and anti-discrimination law 
 
Turning to the first element of this project, multiple discrimination in a multicultural 
Europe. I want to explain briefly what is meant by multiple or intersectional 
                                                
8  See N. Bernard, ‘Legitimising EU Law: Is the Social Dialogue the Way Forward? Some Reflections 
Around the UEAPME Case’, in J. Shaw (ed.) Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union 
(Oxford, 2006) at 280. 
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discrimination, before concentrating more on the question of multiculturalism. At its 
core, intersectionality theory asserts that the law disadvantages those who put forward 
claims premised on multiple rights or multiple identities.9 Originally, the concept of 
intersectionality was developed in the US as a means to examine the dilemma of 
‘women of color’ in bringing employment discrimination claims, because the relevant 
legislative provision, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, required them to plead 
either race or sex discrimination. The literature thus explores examples of the failures of 
US courts to recognize intersections of race and gender,10 alongside the conceptually 
flawed attempts to recognize discrimination arising out of the claimant’s dual minority 
status.11 However, in the process of conceding the existence of discrimination against 
dual minorities, for example an African American woman, the case law in the US failed 
to acknowledge the complexity of their identities. Claims of discrimination were lost 
since such a claimant ‘may be denied the ability to serve as a class representative of 
either women or black people in a discrimination suit … because she is adjudged 
insufficiently representative of the majority of women or the majority of black 
people’.12 An early decision which still provides a good illustration of what an 
intersectional claim would look like in practice is that of DeGraffenreid v General 
Motors.13 Here, five black women alleged that their employer’s redundancy policy of 
‘last in, first out’, and its reliance on a seniority system, perpetuated the effects of past 
discrimination against black women, as there had been a refusal to hire black women in 
                                                
9  M. H. Chen, ‘Hybrid claims of discrimination’ (2004) 79:2 NYU School of Law, Law Review, 685-
711, at 693. The literature is extensive; see, for example work cited in n 11 below and S. Hannett, 
‘Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle Multiple Discrimination’, 
(2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 65-86; G. Moon, ‘Multiple discrimination: problems 
compounded or solutions found? (2006) 3:2 Justice Journal, 86-102; D. G. Reáume, ‘Of Pigeonholes 
and Principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law’ (2002) 40:2 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 
113-143; D. Schiek, ‘Broadening the scope and the Norms of EU Gender Equality Law: Towards a 
Multidimensional Conception of Equality Law’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 427-466; D. Schiek and V. Chege (eds.) European Union Discrimination Law: 
Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law, forthcoming 2008. 
10  See, in particular, Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229; DeGraffenreid v. General Motors 
Assembly Division, 413 F. Supp. 142, (E.D. Mo. 1976) (declining to recognize a protected sub-
category of ‘black women’ with standing independent of black males). 
11  Such as Lam v. University of Hawaii in which the court recognized the discrimination claim of an 
Asian American female job applicant against a hiring committee which favoured Asian American 
men: 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994). See S. Sturm, ‘Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-
First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations’ (1998) 1 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Labor & Employment Law, 639-689; P. M Caldwell, ‘A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the 
Intersection of Race and Gender’ (1991) Duke Law Journal, 365-396; A. P Harris, ‘Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990) Stanford Law Review, 581; K. Crenshaw 
‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum, 139. 
12  Chen, n 9 above, at 694; see Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983). 
13  413 F. Supp 142 (ED Miss. 1976, US Federal Court of Appeals). 
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the past. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to bring a claim not on behalf of 
blacks or women, but specifically on behalf of black women, arguing that black women 
should not be treated any differently from white women or black men: ‘They must 
choose to bring either a race action or a sex action in order to avoid the creation of an 
unauthorised class which would give Black women greater standing and relief’.14 
 
One could envisage other intersections; the question is whether multiple inequalities are 
merely cumulative forms of disadvantage, or whether they might in fact interact to 
create new challenges for anti-discrimination law. Kimberlé Crenshaw, who did much 
to pioneer theorizing on intersectionality, argues that multiple discrimination does not 
merely consisting in the adding of two or more sources of discrimination; the result is 
qualitatively different or synergistic. And the synergistic nature of such discrimination 
makes it harder to frame policy and law and, crucially, it also makes such 
discrimination more difficult to monitor. Many national statistics bodies within the EU 
fail to collect data on race or ethnicity, or data disaggregated by race and gender, never 
mind data disaggregated by other sources of multiple discrimination.15 Accordingly, it 
is the data dimension which preoccupies me in particular, since data is so central to 
evaluating the impact of anti-discrimination policies; to managing targeted approaches 
such as positive action, positive duties or diversity management; and to successful 
litigation. 
 
Some of the complexity of multiple discrimination is slowly being recognised by policy 
makers. With the introduction of Article 13 into the EC Treaty, and the subsequent anti-
discrimination directives, the European Commission has become increasingly aware of 
the concept. For example, it made passing reference in its 2005 communication, a 
framework strategy on non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all, to the 
adoption of an integrated approach to the promotion of non-discrimination and gender 
equality, which takes into account the fact that some people may experience multiple 
discrimination on several grounds.16 A more substantive example is the commissioning 
                                                
14  C. Scarborough, ‘Conceptualizing Black Women’s Employment Experiences’ (1989) 98 Yale Law 
Journal, 1457. A subsequent case in which intersectional claims gained a limited foothold is Jefferies 
v. Harris County Community Action Association, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980). 
15  See S. Fredman, ‘Double Trouble: Multiple Discrimination and EU Law’ (2005) 2 European Anti-
discrimination Law Review, 13-18, at 14. 
16  Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter CEC) Communication, Non-discrimination 
and equal opportunities for all - A framework strategy, Brussels 1.6.2005, COM (2005) 224 final, at 
3. 
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of a report by the Danish Institute for Human Rights, published in September 2007, on 
practices, policies and laws to tackle multiple discrimination.17 
 
However, it is impossible to survey the development of anti-discrimination law at EU 
level in isolation from the dominant theme running through the EU’s wider employment 
and social policy, namely the focus on job creation, economic growth, and 
competitiveness which crystallised with the Lisbon Agenda. The discourse revolves 
around modernizing welfare states and labour markets in order to support not just 
‘more’ but ‘better’ jobs within the EU, and to bring previously excluded groups onto the 
labour market. What is of interest, therefore, is the interaction of a number of the EU’s 
policy agendas: the Lisbon agenda, with its targets to increase rates of labour market 
participation amongst, for instance, both women and ethnic minority groups, and the 
EU’s other policy objectives in particular, long-standing concerns to promote equality 
and social inclusion. It is apparent from the way in which equality and anti-
discrimination issues are integrated into labour market policy at EU level that the major 
concern has at times been a pragmatic one: that inequality leads to inefficient labour 
markets. For example, the rationale behind the EQUAL initiative of the European 
Social Fund is that ‘[d]iscrimination in employment can marginalize individuals and 
reduce their productivity and overall contribution to society’.18 The more recent 
PROGRESS initiative for 2007-2013 (the Community Programme for Employment and 
Social Solidarity) similarly uses anti-discrimination law instrumentally, recognising 
gender equality as a fundamental right, but also as a ‘necessary condition for the 
achievement of EU growth, employment and social cohesion objectives’.19 Gender 
equality policy contributes to meeting the challenges of globalization, the ageing 
population and demography. 
 
To understand the ways in which anti-discrimination legislation might need to be 
reconfigured, and to re-think what equality in this area would mean, it is useful to 
examine patterns of ethnic difference in women’s labour market participation and 
                                                
17  CEC/Danish Institute for Human Rights, Tackling Multiple Discrimination: Practices, Policies and 
Laws (Luxembourg, 2007) available at : 
 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/pubst/stud/multdis_en.pdf. 
18  CEC, EQUAL, Free Movement of Good Ideas, Working against discrimination and inequality in 
Europe (Luxembourg, 2004) at 6. 
19  Decision No 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 
establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity – Progress, OJ L 
315/49, 15.11.2006; see also http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/progress/gen_eq_en.htm. 
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employment experience across the EU. However, a central part of this process is how to 
deal with the deep-seated differences between European states in understandings of 
‘race’ and multiculturalism. As will become apparent, these divergent paradigms have 
important implications for regulatory responses to inequality. They are also reflected in 
differences in terminology and approaches to data collection, such that there are real 
difficulties with classifying and measuring EU labour markets by ‘race’ and ethnicity, 
alongside statistics on gender, and with making meaningful comparisons of data across 
Member States. 
 
Differing national paradigms in discourses around ‘race’ and multiculturalism 
 
At a descriptive level, one might easily say that many EU states are multicultural, in the 
limited sense of being multiethnic. However, not all states within the EU would seek to 
describe themselves as multicultural societies, in the sense of being committed to the 
political project of multiculturalism. And these self-understandings have important 
implications for conceptualizations of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ and policies towards labour 
market integration of excluded or underrepresented groups. Multiculturalism is such a 
deeply contentious idea, perhaps better, an essentially contested term. As Stuart Hall 
puts it, the term ‘is now universally deployed… [but] this proliferation has neither 
stabilized nor clarified its meaning’.20 However imprecise the term ‘multiculturalism’ 
is, it can nevertheless usefully be contrasted with alternative strategies or models of 
inclusion, such as assimilation or integration.21 Assimilation is typically used to refer to 
a process of absorption of minorities, or the uni-directional process by which minorities 
adopt a commitment to an orthodox, hegemonic majority group identity and culture.22 
Integration, as a concept is used in various ways in Europe. For some, it is virtually 
interchangeable with assimilation, but more commonly, it is understood to mean a two-
way process of social interaction involving change in values, norms and behaviour for 
both newcomers and members of the existing society.23 It can mean a genuine process 
                                                
20  S. Hall, ‘Conclusion: The Multi-cultural Question’ in Barnor Hesse (ed.) Un/settled 
Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, ‘Transruptions’ (London, 2000) at 209. 
21  See T. Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge, 2007) 46-51; E. Vasta, ‘Accommodating 
diversity: Why current critiques of multiculturalism miss the point’ Centre on Migration Policy and 
Society, University of Oxford, Working Paper No. 53, 2007, WP-07-53, at 4-8. 
22  See R. Grillo, ‘Backlash Against Diversity? Identity and Cultural Politics In European Cities’ Centre 
on Migration Policy and Society, University of Oxford, Working Paper No. 14, WP-05-14. 
23  S. Castles, M. Korac, E. Vasta and S. Vertovec, Integration: Mapping the Field (London: Home 
Office, 2003) at 14-15; Modood, n 21 above, at 48. 
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of supporting immigrants to integrate into the receiving society, whilst not necessarily 
requiring the accommodation of diversity.24 
 
And multiculturalism: for the purposes of this article, by this I mean the political 
accommodation of minority ethnic and religious groups in the context of immigration to 
western European countries from outside the west.25 I’m aware that this is a limited 
version of multiculturalism, but it has been the case that multiculturalism debates in 
Europe, in contrast to Australia for example, have primarily concerned the management 
of migration-based ethnicity.26 This does of course include the question of the degree of 
cultural and religious accommodation of minority groups,27 but my interest here is 
predominately in relation to participation in economic life. Those who use 
multiculturalism in a positive sense, focus on ‘ideals of tolerance, the right of ethnic 
minority groups to maintain aspects of cultural heritage and language; equal treatment, 
equal access and full participation with regard to matters of law, employment, 
education, social services, economic activity and political representation; rights to 
collective expression’.28 Researchers at the Centre on Migration Policy and Society at 
the University of Oxford have written widely on critiques of multiculturalism and the 
backlash against diversity in the wider political sphere.29 For instance, Ellie Vasta talks 
                                                
24  See Vasta, n 21 above, at 5-6. 
25  Borrowing from Modood, n 21 above, at 5. 
26  See C. Joppke, ‘The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State’ (2004) 55:2 British Journal of 
Sociology, 237-257, at 239. For a discussion of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of multiculturalism, see 
Grillo, n 22 above, at 6: ‘If we examine the many multicultural initiatives across Europe and beyond 
we may observe that they fall along a spectrum from “weak”, where cultural diversity is recognised 
and accepted in the private sphere, but there is a high degree of assimilation to the local population in 
employment, housing, education, health and welfare, with acculturation in many areas of life, to 
“strong” where there is institutional recognition for cultural difference in the public sphere, with 
special provision in language, education, health care, welfare etc, and the organisation of 
representation on ethnic/cultural lines’. 
27  See, for instance, the speech of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, at the Royal 
Courts of Justice, 7 February 2008, available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575: 
‘[T]here remains a great deal of uncertainty about what degree of accommodation the law of the 
land can and should give to minority communities with their own strongly entrenched legal and 
moral codes. As such, this is not only an issue about Islam but about other faith groups, including 
Orthodox Judaism; and indeed it spills over into some of the questions which have surfaced 
sharply in the last twelve months about the right of religious believers in general to opt out of 
certain legal provisions – as in the problems around Roman Catholic adoption agencies which 
emerged in relation to the Sexual Orientation Regulations last spring’ (Emphasis added). 
These sentiments were subsequently echoed and supported by Lord Phillips, Lord Chief Justice, in his 
speech ‘Equality Before the Law’ to the East London Muslim Centre, 3rd July 2008; available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/. 
28  S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf, ‘Migration and Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity in 
Europe: An overview of issues and trends’ Centre on Migration Policy and Society, University of 
Oxford, Working Paper No. 18, 2005, WP-05-18, at 3. 
29  See, for example, Vasta, n 21 above; R. Grillo, ‘Backlash Against Diversity? Identity and Cultural 
Politics In European Cities’ Centre on Migration Policy and Society, University of Oxford, Working 
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of the ‘moral panic’ over immigration and ethnic and religious diversity being 
experienced within many European countries of immigration. The retreat from 
multiculturalism across Europe is justified on numerous grounds: 
 
[t]hat multiculturalism leads to segregation; it leads to welfare dependency; it prevents immigrants 
from integrating into the dominant culture and national identity; by extension, immigrants do not take 
the responsibility to integrate; multiculturalism undermines western democratic values; it allows an 
inflated ‘tolerance’ to cultural and religious difference; it is too focused on cultural rights of groups 
rather than on the rights of the individual.30 
 
However, for the purposes of my interest in anti-discrimination, such ‘moral panic’ or 
critical discourse is problematic in that the primary focus has been on the ‘culture’ part 
of the equation, with insufficient attention to the continuing inequality experienced by 
many immigrant groups within societal institutions and structures, such as the labour 
market. 
 
Why is this significant to an analysis of multidimensional discrimination? My argument 
is that the view of race or ethnicity which informs a state’s policy interventions, the 
state’s perception of itself as aspiring towards homogeneity or integration or 
multicultural accommodation will influence how discrimination is conceived, what the 
vision of an equal society will look like, and whether certain types of diversity are seen 
as a legitimate aspiration. The retreat from a strong or even a weak version of 
multiculturalism in those states which have had experience of accommodating 
difference may well constrain policy experimentation or reinforce a perception of 
‘equality fatigue’. Furthermore, there is a strong unwillingness within many EU states, 
in particular those which adopt integrationist or assimilationist policies, to identify 
populations by reference to race or ethnicity, a reluctance to engage in ethnic- or race-
conscious data collection. Those states which promote assimilation of minority ethnic 
and religious groups, over multicultural recognition of ethnic and other differences,31 
typically exhibit a deep ideological resistance to the idea of using ‘race’ as a social 
                                                                                                                                          
Paper No. 14, WP-05-14; Reassessing Multiculturalism in Europe: Critical debates, changing policies 
and concrete practices, COMPAS International Workshop, University of Oxford, 30 June-1 July 
2006. 
30  Vasta, n 21 above, at 25. Further, on the ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ see Modood, n 21 above, at 10 et 
seq; and C. Joppke, ‘The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy’ (2004) 55:2 
British Journal of Sociology, 237–257 
31  See E. Bleich, ‘The Legacies of History? Colonization and Immigrant Integration in Britain and 
France’, (2005) 34:2 Theory and Society, 171-95. 
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signifier and of categorizing their populations according to this criterion.32 This 
unwillingness can be understood for example through the lens of the French discourse, 
in that whilst there is a wide range of literature on the phenomenon of immigration in 
the post war years (in particular that from former colonies),33 few French scholars 
utilize the analytical category of ‘race’.34 The management of post-colonial immigration 
in France is often placed in sharp contrast with the experience in the UK. It’s easy to 
almost caricature these two countries as being at opposite ends of the spectrum with, for 
instance: 
 
France emphasizing the universalist idea of integration, of transforming immigrants into full French 
citoyens; and Britain seeing integration as a question of managing public order and relations between 
majority and minority populations, and allowing ethnic cultures and practices to mediate the process.35 
 
However, in my view, this somewhat overstates the difference in that neither country’s 
policies are wholly internally consistent: one can point to pluralist elements and 
recognition of group rights in French policies,36 and to pro-assimilationist trends in UK 
policy. But what is more important for my purposes is the dominant self-perception 
within national discourse. In the French case: the aspiration to be a secular state, 
premised on the idea of republican citizenship, which shuns the recognition of 
difference in the public sphere.37 This approach is variously attributed to a number of 
factors: the Revolution and the republican ideal; the memory of the Vichy regime and 
its racial categorization of Jews; and the more recent experience of electoral resurgence 
of extreme rightwing parties. As a result, the French state is avowedly ‘colour-blind’ in 
its policies;38 a colour-blindness which has consistently received scholarly and 
intellectual support. This is related to a perception of equality which requires the state to 
treat all citizens alike; differentiation based on ethnic origin is seen as stigmatizing and 
                                                
32  See E. Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s 
(Cambridge, 2003); A. Geddes and V. Guiraudon, ‘Britain, France, and EU Anti-Discrimination 
Policy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm’ (2004) 27: 2 West European Politics, 334-353. 
33  For references, see E. Bleich, ‘Antiracism without Races: Politics and policy in a “color-blind” state’ 
(2000) 18:3 French Politics, Culture and Society, 48-74. 
34  Bleich, n 33 above, at 49. 
35  A. Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain 
(London, 1998) at 3-4. 
36  For a critique of the standard characterization, see Bleich n 31 above. 
37  ‘Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves 
manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit’: Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 
2004. 
38  Bleich, n 33 above, at 49-50. See also E. Bleich, ‘The legacies of history? Colonization and immigrant 
integration in Britain and France’ (2005) 3 Theory and Society, 171-195, at 188-9. 
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potentially discriminatory.39 All this serves to reinforce the official opposition to the 
collection of racial or ethnic data on citizens and residents; an opposition which has 
been codified in France since 1978 through the prohibition of computerized storage of 
data on racial origins save in limited circumstances.40 
 
The French approach to race discrimination, in the labour market and elsewhere, has 
been referred to as a policy of ‘anti-racism without races’.41 Whilst there has been anti-
racism legislation since 1972, establishing criminal penalties for discrimination and 
criminalizing hate speech, this is primarily rooted in a paradigm which conceives of 
anti-discriminatory measures as a means to combat the ideas of the extreme right, rather 
than as a tool for integrating ethnic or religious minorities or the management of visible 
migrant minorities.42 Whilst there are some advantages to this colour blind approach, in 
France’s ‘republican’ model of citizenship (the assumption that acquisition of French 
citizenship is the crucial step to attaining equality), nevertheless, there are in my view 
major drawbacks, especially in the context of labour market discrimination. The state 
does not permit data collection on race or ethnicity, thus making it difficult to gauge the 
relative well-being of minorities.43 The lack of statistics means it is near impossible to 
prove indirect discrimination, proving direct discrimination is also difficult,44 and 
group-targeted policies are judged illegitimate.45 
 
A European paradigm or discourse? 
 
In this context, it is difficult to say that the EU has been able to impose a distinctively 
European paradigm or discourse. I’m interested in the extent to which the EU can 
engage effectively in law- and policy-making which seeks to redress racial and ethnic 
inequality and disadvantage, without seeking to impose a uniform standard for 
                                                
39  J. Ringelheim and O. de Schutter, ‘The Processing of Racial and Ethnic Data in Anti-Discrimination 
Policies: Reconciling the Promotion of Equality with Privacy Rights’, 8 November 2007, manuscript 
on file with the author, at 46. 
40  Namely, the storage of data on racial and ethnic origins is outlawed without the express consent of the 
individual or the formal approval of a national commission: French Act on Computing, Files and 
Liberties of 6 January 1978 (as modified by the Act of 6 August 2004). (Loi relative à l’informatique, 
aux fichiers et aux libertés du 6 janvier 1978, modifiée par la loi du 6 août 2004). For discussion, see 
Ringelheim and Schutter, n 39 above.  
41  Bleich, n 33 above. 
42  See Geddes and Guiraudon, n 32 above, 347. 
43  Bleich, n 33 above, at 66. 
44  Geddes and Guiraudon, n 32 above, 339-340. 
45  Bleich, n 33 above, at 66. 
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conceptualizing race or ethnicity, given the background of highly heterogeneous 
approaches to the integration of minority groups.46 It is worth briefly considering the 
example of the Race Directive of 2000.47 To begin with, there is the insistence, at the 
behest of those Member States predominantly espousing a ‘colour blind’ approach to 
the management of minority ethnic groups, that the concept of ‘race’ is unacceptable. 
Accordingly, a form of words was inserted into the Preamble of the Race Directive 
(Recital 6) to signal a clear rejection of ‘race’ as a valid analytical category.48 This 
spoke largely to the rejection of theories of scientific racism which posit the existence 
of separate human races. However, it is possible to reject those theories whilst 
recognizing the analytical and political utility of ‘race’ or ethnicity. A preferable 
approach is that adopted within much sociological discourse, which recognizes that 
ethnicity is a cultural not a biological concept, and similarly that race is a social 
construct: ‘from a sociological point of view, “race” denotes a particular way in which 
communal differences come to be constructed and therefore it cannot be erased from the 
analytical map’.49 
 
More significant is the treatment in the Race Directive of race-conscious data collection 
and statistics.50 There are a number of purposes which may be served by the collection 
of statistical data on racial or ethnic lines: to guide and support policy development; in 
order to evaluate the impact of anti-discrimination policies; for the purposes of 
monitoring – at workplace level, by government agencies; in order to target public 
policies at certain groups, for example, in the context of positive action or to impose 
positive duties on public or even private bodies; and finally, in judicial proceedings, in 
order to assist in proving or rebutting a discrimination claim.51 The Race Directive, on 
the one hand broadens the definition of indirect discrimination, codifying the case law 
of the European Court of Justice. Article 2(2)(b) reads: 
 
                                                
46  For instance, it is not the case that there has been homogeneity in the approach to gender equality, 
such as uniform approaches to affirmative action within Member States’ legal systems. 
47  Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L180/22, 19.7.2000. 
48  ‘The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human 
races. The use of the term “racial origin” in this Directive does not imply an acceptance of such 
theories’. 
49  F. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis, Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and 
the Anti-racist Struggle (London, 2001) at 1-2; references omitted. 
50  Again, there doesn’t yet seem to me to be an identifiably European paradigm, but see Geddes and 
Guiraudon, n 32 above. 
51  See CEC/ T. Makkonen, European handbook on equality data (Luxembourg, 2006). 
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indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with 
other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim 
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 
 
This more expansive definition of indirect discrimination is to be welcomed; it 
recognizes that statistical information is not the only means to establish a prima facie 
case of indirect discrimination. This has the potential to free litigants from the 
complexities of a statistical analysis, for example, the difficulty of identifying the 
correct pool for comparison which has thwarted complainants in antidiscrimination 
cases before UK courts. However, whilst requiring Member States to establish equality 
bodies for the promotion of equal treatment, to monitor workplace practices and 
discrimination more widely, the Directive does not make it an express requirement that 
States should collect data on the racial and ethnic composition of their populations. This 
is a missed opportunity: carefully designed systems of data collection signal official 
recognition that discrimination does not consist solely of individual isolated acts of 
prejudice, but may have a structural and institutional character, that the situation of 
groups needs to be compared.52 But also, by giving Member States a choice as to 
whether they institute a regime of data collection or allow statistics to be called in aid in 
proving discrimination, would seem to reinforce a limited understanding of 
discrimination and restrict the options available to complainants or victims. The impact 
of indirect discrimination will not be visible unless data exists which allows the 
differential impact of seemingly neutral provisions to be seen. Further, the Directive 
permits ‘positive action’ as a type of anti-discrimination activity, which generally 
requires ethnic monitoring in order to be meaningful.53 
 
However, although the political negotiations leading to the enactment of the Race 
Directive resulted in this compromise over the question of race and data collection, it 
would appear that a process of mutual learning and policy transfer is nevertheless 
leading to greater willingness to accept the role that such statistics may play in 
antidiscrimination policy. In recent years, scholars immersed in the assimilationist or 
                                                
52  Ringelheim and de Schutter, n 39 above, at 19. 
53  The view of the European Commission is that the scarcity of ethnic data in most Member States might 
hinder proper monitoring of the application of Community legislation: CEC Communication, The 
application of Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Brussels, 30.10.2006 COM(2006) 643 final, at 
9. 
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colour blind tradition have been seeking to interrogate the assumption of official colour-
blindness and to engage with the concept of ‘race’. For instance, to return to the French 
example, even here, a number of government-commissioned reports since 2000 have 
given cautious support to the development of ethnic monitoring at the level of the 
firm.54 
 
Comparability of statistical data across EU Member States  
 
The current state of play is that Member States retain their own distinctive, historically 
specific approaches, although there is some EU level coordination. The European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia was established in 1997, and in 2007 
was subsumed within the EU Fundamental Rights Agency. Its task has been to provide 
objective and comparable information on racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-
Semitism. To do so, the Monitoring Centre mainly engages in the secondary collection 
of data through a network of 27 national ‘focal points’ (RAXEN, the Information 
Network on Racism and Xenophobia). States seem relatively willing to collect direct 
evidence of discrimination in the form of reported incidents – for example, of racist 
violence – formal complaints and court cases. But the absence of statistical evidence on 
national and ethnic origin means that discrimination in the fields of employment, 
education and housing is difficult to quantify within a country, and compare between 
countries.55 And in particular, trying to bring together the statistics on gender, with 
those on ethnicity, to obtain a portrait of intersectionality will be even more difficult. 
 
Successive Monitoring Centre reports highlight the diversity of approaches in the EU 
Member States. The absence of standardized mechanisms to collect data and monitor 
progress is a real concern.56 It is difficult to form representative and comparable 
statistical groups out of the immigrant and minority populations in the EU Member 
States because states use a number of legal and statistical concepts for their minority 
populations – terms such as ethnic minorities, immigrants, foreign-born, third-country 
                                                
54  C. Bébéar, Rapport au Premier Ministre – Minorités visibles: relever le défi de l’accès à l’emploi et 
de l’intégration dans l’entreprise – Des entreprises aux couleurs de la France, (Visible minorities: 
Addressing the challenge of access to employment and integration in the workplace, Bébéar Report) 
November 2004, quoted in Ringelheim and de Schutter, n 39 above. 
55  European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) Racism and Xenophobia in the EU 
Member States: Trends, Developments and Good Practice, EUMC Annual Report 2005: Part 2, at 
100. 
56  CEC, Equality and non-discrimination in an enlarged European Union: Green Paper (Luxembourg, 
2004) at 22-3. 
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nationals, and aliens.57 The differences in statistical terminology to some extent map on 
to the paradigms discussed earlier, to diverse histories with immigration, diversity in 
legal frameworks, and in responses to integration of, and discrimination against, 
minority groups. As mentioned earlier, this diversity of approaches means that, in some 
EU countries, statistics based on ethnicity are proscribed by law and in most countries 
data based on country of origin (or country of birth) are simply not available.58 
However, as the UK data show, different labour market outcomes and patterns of 
discrimination emerge depending on whether one focuses on ethnicity, race, religion, 
citizenship status, national origin or some other category of identity. For example, a 
common factor for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in the UK is that over 90 per cent 
are Muslim, ‘with many younger women choosing to identify on faith rather than ethnic 
lines’, such that Muslim women in, or seeking to enter, the labour market confront 
additional stereotypes associated with their faith and culture.59 
 
Given these caveats about the statistics, it is nevertheless clear that national labour 
markets are still highly segmented along national or ethnic lines. Generally, labour force 
participation rates are highest in Nordic countries and the UK and lowest in southern 
European countries. There are disparities across the Member States, but what is striking 
are the relative inequalities: the stark differences between the labour market 
participation of minority compared to majority national groups, with persistently high 
levels of long-term unemployment for certain minority ethnic groups. In the case of the 
UK, ethnic minorities’ labour market attainment is comparatively poor on all the  
                                                
57  ‘Theoretically, the production of EU-wide standardized data through the Labour Force Surveys of 
EUROSTAT should overcome these problems. In practice, however, relevant data on migrants and 
minorities, that are sufficiently detailed to yield a representative picture of inequalities on the labour 
market, do not exist. Part of this shortfall is due to the variety of concepts currently used in the EU 
Member States to describe ‘their’ immigrants and minorities (see also Section 3.2.). In addition, the 
small sample size of the Labour Force Survey makes even available economic data on ‘foreigners’ (in 
general) in some EU Member States very unreliable, and even more so for certain nationalities. We 
have therefore chosen to revert to the available national data only, while simultaneously pointing out 
the limitations of this approach’: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 
Migrants, Minorities and Employment: Exclusion, Discrimination and Anti-Discrimination in 15 
Member States of the European Union (Vienna, 2003) at 28, fn 44. 
58  European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Migrants, Minorities and 
Employment: Exclusion, Discrimination and Anti-Discrimination in 15 Member States of the 
European Union (Vienna, 2003) at 15. See also J. Ringelheim, ‘Processing Data on Racial or Ethnic 
Origin for Antidiscrimination Policies: How to Reconcile the Promotion Of Equality With The Right 
To Privacy?’ NYU School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 08/06. 
59  Equal Opportunities Commission, Moving on up? Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black Caribbean 
women and work: Early findings from the EOC’s investigation in England (Manchester, 2006) at 5. 
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main measures, with consistently low employment rates across most ethnic minority 
groups.60 As for unemployment, with the exception of Indian and Chinese adult men, 
very high rates of unemployment have persisted for ethnic minority groups over a long 
time. In 1992, the unemployment rate of Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black Caribbean 
men was 15-20 percentage points higher than that of their White counterparts. By 2000, 
although the scale of this disparity had decreased, a difference of approximately 10-15 
percentage points remained. Unemployment levels fell sharply for all groups during the 
1990s. Despite this, the overall employment position of ethnic minorities at the end of 
the decade generally remained considerably worse than that of the White population.61 
And disaggregating race and gender, one finds that some groups have extremely low 
labour force participation rates, for example 30 per cent for Pakistani women.62 
 
Within employment, third country nationals of both genders tend to be heavily 
concentrated in particular sectors of the labour market. But women with a migrant 
background are disproportionately found employed in low-skilled, low-paid jobs, in 
atypical or precarious employment in sectors such as personal and domestic services, 
cleaning, catering, health and care.63 Looking again at the UK, having adjusted for the 
influence of individual characteristics and relevant variables such as age, educational 
level and human capital, there remain serious net differences in labour market 
achievements, sometimes also called ‘ethnic penalties’, of which discrimination is likely 
to be a major component.64 
 
COMPLEX DISCRIMINATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE 
 
Turning now to the role of new governance in tackling such discrimination and 
promoting equality. New governance techniques have been adopted in the pre-labour 
market context. The European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Agenda have as 
their goals the achievement of full employment, the reduction of unemployment and 
investment in human capital. These strategies contain policy prescriptions highlighting 
                                                
60  Although within this overall picture, there are important differences between ethnic groups, with are 
low rates of economic activity and employment among Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, but high levels 
of economic activity and employment among Black Caribbeans: Cabinet Office (UK Government) 
Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market, Final Report (London, 2003) at 18. 
61  Ibid., at 18-20. 
62  EUMC n 58 above, at 33. 
63  EUMC n 58 above, at 5; see also Fredman n 15 above, at 14. 
64  A. Heath and S. Y. Cheung, Ethnic penalties in the labour market: Employers and discrimination, 
Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 341, DWP: 2006, at 5 and 51. 
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the need to integrate disadvantaged groups, in particular, women, immigrants and 
minorities into the labour market.65 What is innovative about the Employment Strategy 
and the Lisbon Agenda is that such goals are to be achieved not solely, or even 
primarily, through traditional forms of hard law. These strategies (under the umbrella of 
the ‘open method of coordination’ or OMC) rely on guidelines, benchmarks, peer 
review and the dissemination of best practice from those Member States which score 
highly on key indicators such as rates of labour market participation, or integration of 
minority groups. Policy makers are resorting to new governance techniques, in 
particular the open method of coordination, not so much to displace hard law or old 
governance techniques, but to enter into new territory for EU level regulation, areas 
which had traditionally been the preserve of Member State control.66 
 
This phenomenon has been described as a shift of power as between the nation state and 
the EU level, in its focus on self-regulation, participatory decision-making and local 
problem solving in place of the external imposition of universal rules. But if that is a 
fair assessment of what new governance entails, then perhaps such thinking can also 
help make sense descriptively of what is happening at the level of the firm, or 
normatively, what a regulatory response to post-labour market discrimination might 
look like. One insight of new governance is that devolving authority promotes learning 
more than retaining authority at state level. So my thesis here is that the insights of new 
governance theorizing may well have some purchase in understanding relations between 
state level regulation and that within firms; that new forms of governance can encourage 
what has been called ‘a reconfiguration of self-regulation’,67 so that goals such as 
equality and diversity are internalized by the subjects of regulation. In a way, there is 
nothing new about ‘new’ governance in the labour law context, since the state has 
traditionally recognized or tolerated the autonomy and norm-setting of non-state actors, 
such as the social partners. Labour lawyers are familiar with rules made by a variety of 
labour market actors, and enforced through non-state mechanisms or social practice.68 
 
                                                
65  Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, 
OJ L 205/21, 6.8.2005. 
66  See C. Kilpatrick, ‘New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism’ in G. de Búrca and J. 
Scott (eds.) Law and New Governance in the EU and US (Oxford, 2006). 
67  H. Collins, Book Review (1998) 61 Modern Law Review, 916, at 917. See also C. McCrudden 
‘Equality Legislation and Reflexive Regulation: A Response to the Discrimination Law Review’s 
Consultative Paper’ (2007) 36:3 Industrial Law Journal, 255-266. 
68  B. Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Oxford, 2005) at 268. 
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Legal scholars have in the past been overly preoccupied with rule enforcement of ‘old 
governance’ measures such as directives as a means of achieving social policy goals. 
This old governance model, which privileged rule enforcement, is flawed in that, for 
instance, after decades of European equal treatment and equal pay law there is still a 
significant gender pay gap, on average of 15 per cent across the 27 EU states.69 What is 
worth exploring is whether the coexistence of that rule enforcement approach to anti-
discrimination with a revitalized use of the traditional legislative methods (for example 
to enact equality directives) and new governance mechanisms, such as the 
‘mainstreaming’ of equality, may well be a more effective means of achieving the goals 
of European equality law and in recognizing complex intersectional inequality.70 
 
Susan Sturm’s analysis of law’s role in addressing complex discrimination questions the 
adequacy of ‘rule enforcement’ as a unitary theory of law’s role. So whilst there is 
necessarily room for rules enforced by sanctions, she also envisages a role for the law in 
structuring nonjudicial bases for generating norms and changing behaviour.71 Sturm 
asks how the law does and should interact with organizational and cultural norms to 
reshape the conditions and practices constituting complex discrimination.72 She 
acknowledges that ‘[r]ules enforced by sanctions remain an important backstop and 
platform for normative elaboration in the area of equality jurisprudence’ especially in 
areas of normative simplicity.73 But there needs to be a more ‘dynamic and expansive 
conception of law’s form and function’ to enable equality norms to redress complex 
discrimination. The examples she gives in the US context include greater use of consent 
decrees (compromise agreements) and class certification as a means to establish a 
governance structure that can produce fair, effective and principled norm generation.74 
 
                                                
69  The pay gap has remained steady at 15% since 2003, and has narrowed by only one point since 2000: 
CEC, Report on equality between women and men, 2008, Brussels, 23.1.2008 COM(2008) 10 final, at 
3. 
70  T. Hervey, ‘Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards’ (2005) 
12 Maastricht Journal, 307; J. Shaw, Mainstreaming Equality in European Union Law and 
Policymaking, European Network Against Racism (Brussels 2004); F. Beveridge, S. Nott and K. 
Stephen, ‘Mainstreaming: A Case for Optimism and Cynicism’, (2002) 10: 3 Feminist Legal Studies, 
299-311. 
71  S. Sturm, ‘Law’s Role in Addressing Complex Discrimination’ forthcoming in L. B. Nielsen & R. L. 
Nelson (eds.) Handbook of Employment Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities, (Dordrecht, 
forthcoming 2008) at 8 [page numbers refer to manuscript]. 
72  Sturm, n 71 above, at 9. 
73  Sturm, n 71 above, at 12. 
74  Sturm, n 71 above, at 21. 
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I think that this analysis, which questions the adequacy of rule enforcement as a unitary 
theory of law’s role in addressing complex discrimination, has a great deal of purchase 
as a means by which to understand various regulatory mechanisms that are being 
experimented with as a means to achieve labour market equality. Of the approaches to 
employment equity in the EU such as the promotion of equal opportunities, affirmative 
action, or gender mainstreaming, I would single out the possibilities raised by gender 
mainstreaming and what might be called diversity mainstreaming. Gender 
mainstreaming is yet another problematically open term, but it was described by the 
European Commission as early as 1996 as ‘[t]he systematic integration of the respective 
situations, priorities and needs of women and men in all policies and with a view to 
promoting equality between women and men and mobilising all general policies and 
measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality’.75 More simply, it means 
promoting equality between men and women in all activities and policies at all levels. 
One could even say that gender mainstreaming has been constitutionalized,76 in that the 
Treaty of Amsterdam introduced Article 3(2) into the EC Treaty, which provides that in 
all of its activities, the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote 
equality, between men and women. But the crucial point about the EU’s approach to 
gender mainstreaming is the express recognition that legislation and litigation alone 
cannot tackle the complex and deep-rooted patterns of inequality experienced by some 
groups.77 Mainstreaming therefore presupposes a ‘hybrid’ approach to regulation, which 
combines ‘old governance’ mechanisms such as the Directives and with new 
governance methods, such as the adoption of ambitious employment targets for women 
or targets on the provision of childcare.78 
 
However, one comes away from all the policy documentation on gender mainstreaming 
with a very fuzzy idea of what it means in practice, with ‘limited guidance’ available for 
governments on implementation.79 One of the harshest criticisms of the EU’s use of 
gender mainstreaming is that there is little normative content to the principle, that ‘[i]t is 
not clear what the intended goal of gender mainstreaming is, what sort of equality 
                                                
75  CEC Communication, Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into All Community 
Policies and Activities, COM (96) 67 final, 21.02.1996. 
76  See F. Beveridge, ‘Building against the past: the impact of mainstreaming on EU gender law and 
policy (2007) 32: 2 European Law Review, 193-212. 
77  CEC, n 16 above, at 6. 
78  Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European Council, 15 and 16 March 2002, Bull EU 3/2002, 1–56. 
79  D. Ben-Galim, M. Campbell and J. Lewis, ‘Equality and diversity: a new approach to gender equality 
policy in the UK’ (2007) International Journal of Law in Context, 19-33, at 23. 
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agenda it is supposed to promote, nor how it relates to other equality goals established 
elsewhere in EU law or policy’.80 This is where I think the idea of diversity 
management or diversity mainstreaming can be of assistance, in offering a more fruitful 
way to think about combating discrimination, especially multiple discrimination. To 
date, the focus within EU discourse has been on gender mainstreaming, on integrating a 
concern for gender throughout all policies. But this runs into the difficulty of 
presupposing, for example, that women are a single constituency. In reality, in many 
instances, factors other than gender are the primary cause of discrimination and 
inequality.81 There has been no comprehensive programme of diversity mainstreaming 
drawing upon the other equality grounds, although in a Report on mainstreaming anti-
racism in 2000, the Commission did refer to: ‘the possible extension of the 
“mainstreaming” concept to include all the grounds for discrimination covered under 
Article 13 of [the EC Treaty]’.82 
 
To begin with, it seems necessary to rescue the concept of ‘diversity’ from its use as a 
management tool. There is some ‘conceptual slackness’83 about the way the word is 
used, in particular in managerial discourse. One definition of diversity policies offered 
by the European Commission is very much in that mould, describing diversity policies 
as voluntary initiatives by businesses to recruit, retain, and develop employees from 
diverse social groups.84 The emergence of the concept of diversity management in the 
EU in the 1990s followed the lead of management theorizing in the US. There, diversity 
management emerged as a strategy to create more inclusive workforces, but driven by 
the primary rationale of improving organizational competitiveness, efficiency and 
market advantage. It emphasised the need to recognize differences between employees, 
but in order to maximize the potential of individuals to ensure a more productive work 
environment and to fulfil organizational goals.85 What observers have noted, however, 
is that this rise in managerial rhetoric about diversity went hand in hand with a reduced 
                                                
80  Beveridge, n 76 above, at 196. 
81  O. Hankivsky, ‘Gender vs. Diversity Mainstreaming: A Preliminary Examination of the Role and 
Transformative Potential of Feminist Theory’ (2005) 38:4 Canadian Journal of Political Science, 
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83  John Wrench, Diversity Management and Discrimination: Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the 
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84  CEC/Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services The Costs and Benefits of Diversity A Study on 
Methods and Indicators to Measure the Cost-Effectiveness of Diversity Policies in Enterprises 
Executive Summary, 2003, at 2. 
85  Wrench, n 83 above, at3. 
 21 
support for the civil rights legacy and affirmative action practices.86 Diversity rhetoric 
was somehow seen as less threatening that equality rhetoric, and also as more politically 
palatable,87 especially in the context of what one might call ‘equality fatigue’. 
 
This approach has, in large part, been mirrored within the EU: depoliticizing the 
contentious elements of equality discourse, and concentrating on the business case for 
diversity.88 This business case has been championed, in particular, by the European 
Commission, possibly at the expense of the social justice arguments.89 And a major 
problem with the business case for diversity is that, as Lizzie Barmes and Sue Ashtiany 
have cautioned, it typically contains ambiguity about the role of anti-discrimination 
law.90 In other words, management rhetoric reinterprets or reframes legal ideas about 
equality contained in anti-discrimination law, in order to make it more consistent with 
internal managerial prerogatives.91 
 
Whilst the use of diversity as a management tool may detract from its use in anti-
discrimination policies,92 it is nevertheless possible to reclaim the diversity concept and 
link it with ideas and techniques of mainstreaming. But diversity rhetoric needs to be re-
positioned as an instrument first and foremost of social justice and equality, not as a 
human resource management tool, which means integrating the legal and diversity 
perspectives. As Barmes and Ashtiany put it, the processes which organizations adopt 
for identifying diversity priorities must be integrated with their processes for ensuring 
compliance with existing and coming anti-discrimination law.93 This means dealing 
with the flawed tendency within managerial discourse on diversity to present it as an 
alternative to equality or equal opportunities approaches. A more conceptually 
sophisticated discourse on diversity would allow for a heterogeneous understanding of 
identity and the components that comprise it;94 this understanding of diversity does not 
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presuppose that equality means assimilating to a particular standard, such as a male 
norm or a white norm. With respect to UK workplaces, this broader understanding of 
diversity may be strengthened by the recent Equality Bill, which seeks to create a space 
within which employers can promote diversity within a non-symmetrical model of 
equality, namely, the promotion of diversity by extending the scope of ‘positive action’ 
so that employers can take under-representation into account when selecting between 
two equally qualified candidates.95 
 
CONCLUSIONS: HYBRID APPROACHES TO EQUALITY REGULATION 
 
In conclusion, as Tamara Hervey has argued, ‘where we seek to resolve complex social 
problems, such as inequality of women and men, a notion of “mixity” or “hybridity” of 
old governance and new governance probably holds the key to the realization of our 
goals’.96 This hybridity has been echoed in the European Commission’s own thinking, 
arguing in the context of gender equality for a ‘dual approach’ based on gender 
mainstreaming and specific measures.97 My argument is that such an approach can and 
should be extended to the other equality grounds. Further, in respect of the intersection 
of race and gender, the Equal Treatment and Article 13 Directives provide a framework 
which, if Member States fully implement their provisions, can provide a starting point 
for recognition of intersectionality. The Race Directive in particular offers an intriguing 
prospect of hybrid regulation: a traditional old governance mechanism, namely a 
binding Community legislative act, which nevertheless contains within it the seeds for 
the development of new governance mechanisms – such as the scope envisaged for 
national equality agencies, ethnic monitoring and positive action – which may enhance 
its effectiveness. 
 
The value of the move here to new governance approaches comes from the 
acknowledgement that a focus on (traditional forms of) litigation and ex-post rule 
enforcement has been inadequate to alter managerial discourse or restructure internal 
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labour markets; that such objectives may well be better achieved through retaining legal 
remedies in the background, whilst ‘mainstreaming’ values such as equality and 
diversity. Diversity mainstreaming has the potential to focus attention on how equality 
law does or should interact with organizational norms to combat intersectional 
discrimination. However, it is problematic if, in the wake of the Lisbon Strategy with its 
focus on the achievement of a competitive economy and full employment, diversity at 
EU level is conceptualized as primarily about improving organizational competitiveness 
and efficiency, as evidenced, for example, in the frequent references to ‘the business 
case’ for diversity. This conceptualization serves merely to reflect or reinforce existing 
managerial priorities. The other EU agenda I mentioned, the values of the EU’s equality 
agenda implicit in Article 13, need to be made more explicit and woven through law 
and policy-making. 
 
 
 
